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this regard, the chapter challenges previous literature by questioning the neutrality of infrastructure for collective action.
Empirical analysis: Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework
The governance of OCCs will be analyzed though the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, building on the work of Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg who adapt IAD from natural commons to constructed commons in the cultural environment.
References to Schweik and English's (2012) adaptation of IAD to FLOSS will also be made. In this regard, the chapter will also provide an assessment of IAD in the analysis of OCCs.
The empirical data were drawn from a statistical analysis of 50 cases and four case study comparisons on OCCs conducted in 2010. (Fuster and Morell 2010) For the statistical analysis of 50 units, a codebook was used to collect the data from digital threads available at the OCCs websites. In the case of OCCs, random selection is difficult given that the universe is unknown. Nevertheless, the sample tried to reflect the heterogeneity of OCCs. For the sampling, a snowball method was used. The strategy employed in selecting the units for the sample was based on selecting the cases which fulfilled the OCCs definition and had a global scope. From the cases that conformed to these two criteria, the cases covered were a variety of OCCs following two central sampling guidelines. First, there had to be a balance between more recent and older organizations. Secondly, there had to be a balance between the several types of technological base and knowledge goal central interests of the OCCs (e.g., multimedia archives, libraries, encyclopedias, dictionaries, information nodes, software programs, collective social memory, among others).
The statistical analysis pointed to four models of governance that will be presented though the chapter. These informed the selection of the four case studies, each associated with one of the four models. The four case studies were Wikipedia, Wikihow, Flickr, and the Social 
II. Online creation communities viewed through an analytical framework directed at institutional analysis and development
This section views OCCs through the analytical framework of institutional analysis and development (IAD). Reference is made to the adaptation of Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg (2010) of the framework to constructed commons (see figure I ). First, resource characteristics, community attributes, and the governance of OCCs are presented. In the following section, OCCs outcomes are presented along with an analysis of how resource characteristics, community attributes, and rulesinuse/governance might impact upon them. Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg provide a characterization of the cultural environment as being that within which commons construction emerges. They also recognize that the background environment for a particular commons may need further specification and analysis in order to situate the description, classification and analysis of resource characteristics, community attributes, and governance institutions. In the analysis of OCCs, a specific environmental setting is involved and needs to be considered. The Internet is the specific environment within which OCCs emerge and their commonpool resource is hosted.
The Internet as an environment is shaped by the digital culture, the technological constraints of virtual spheres, as well as the legal frameworks that regulate it.
A. Resource characteristics of OCCs
The pooled resources in OCCs are not given resources that need to be "preserved" as in natural commonspool resources. Rather, they are resources that need to be built. OCCs, indeed, arise from the collective goal of building a specific resource. The building process is characterized by the pooling of dispersed information and cognitive capacities in evolving bodies of shared knowledge. The resource tends to be conceived of as a permanent work in progress, and in most of the cases, without a specific moment of definitive conclusion.
The OCCs are immaterial in nature, consisting of information and knowledge. As public goods, they are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg (2010) rights, that is existing only because of the IP rights, or mediating among communities with different default norms. Most OCCs, including the four case studies considered here, fall into the first category, as they exist as part of IP rights.
According to Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg (2010) 
Community size
OCCs are generally open to participation, but such openness does not necessarily result in actual participation. The size of the community of participants depends substantially on the goal of each OCC, ranging from more broad to more restricted sets of interests. One rightly expects that an encyclopedia attracts more participants than a site organized around visualization techniques. In the following section each of these eight aspects will be presented in detail.
i) Collective mission or goal of the process
In general, the goal or mission of OCCs is building and sharing a commonpool resource. The specific mission is defined by the early participants or by the infrastructure provider. Then, the overall system is shaped by experiences with fulfillment of this initial mission. However, participants do not need to identify with the mission or the project as a whole in order to contribute. figure, but the founders of the process are connected, keeping their position. Giving importance to the figure of the founder is connected to a social norm (meritocracy) and is presented in the following section which considers importance given to values merited.
ii) Cultural principles/social norms
There is a set of cultural principles and values that tend to be present transversally in the culture of OCCs. These also feed the way these eight dimensions are performed and function. Among these key principles are: openness and "freedom to operate", meritocracy, and flexibility. Openness and "freedom to operate" without seeking permission or preclearance by a manager or property owner (in Benkler's terms, 2006 (in Benkler's terms, , 2013 , might be present though the license that favors freedom to access and use the resource, or freedom though the openness of the process and the autonomy of the participants to allocate his or her own participation.
Meritocracy or "doacracy" refers to valuing individuals on the base of the quantity and quality of their contributions, not on the basis of "who" they are in terms of external credentials or their opinions. Doacracy also refers to the tendency in some OCCs for whoever does something to also have authority over it. Flexibility refers to the methods or preestablished formats. OCCs tend to be more mission oriented -accomplish something -than method oriented -to do something in a particular manner. Benkler (2013) refers to this question by pointing to the "in determinity" of the governance of peer production.
In the following section, further social norms will be presented, as they are also present in the way the platform is designed.
iii) Design of the platform of participation (where regulation is embedded in the code)
In OCCs, it is relatively rare for individuals to be involved in direct dialogues and negotiations amongst themselves. Instead, individuals interact with the platform design.
Platform design thus influences participation and interaction. In this section, the design of the platform of participation and social norms is presented. As we will see from the analysis, the way in which the environment is designed by the code of the platforms is very much in line with the OCC's social norms.
The design of the participation platform is embedded and regulated in the code. Many diverse code programs can support a platform of participation. Here we present a set of principles embedded in the platforms that embody and guide participation in OCCs. The provision of the platform is controlled by the infrastructure provider. More or less involvement from the community in the platform design depends on the level of openness of the infrastructure providing community involvement.
1. Openness
Openness as it applies to the access to the resource
Openness as applied to the access to the resource is defined by Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg (2010, 695) as "our capacity to relate to a resource by accessing and using it".
In terms of the conditions of access and use of the resources in OCCs, as we will see later, free licenses favor free use. Yet how the knowledge resources are actually made available also determines the possibility of accessing and using them. In this regard, it is common for the 
Openness as it applies to the community building the resource
Openness to interrelation and participation within the community for collaborative commonpool resource building is a significant principle at work in OCCs. Openness to participation is made operative through the provision of channels that allow intervention in content creation, as well as through the protocols that guide those channels. Protocols refer, for example, to low requirements for credentials to participate.
According to the statistical analysis conducted for 50 cases, (Fuster Morell 2010) OCCs usually have an average of four different channels of participation (i.e., the possibility to add comments to a specific section of the content, upload materials, and edit Web pages, among others). The protocols that guide participation in OCCs appear to incentivize participation in a high percentage of the cases (i.e., 80% of the registration systems allow automatic registration without requiring any filter to become part of the platform). This contributes to lowering the transaction costs involved in becoming an active contributor. In all of the four case studies discussed here, indicators for the importance of openness are present: they all employ easy to use technology and channels for open participation, and they do not ask for credentials or The principle of openness to participation is not only embedded in the design of the platform of participation, it is also present in social norms. For instance, in OCC discourses, it is emphasized that the community is provided accessibility for participation. In this line,
Wikipedia is presented as "the encyclopedia that anyone can edit". 
Participation is mostly asynchronous and online
As presented in the previous section, participation is decentralized to projects in OCCs.
Furthermore, it is not implied in terms of either the platform design or social norms that participants congregate at the same time within the platform. Asynchronous participation in the platform is common to all the case studies.
One moment at which some participants might congregate at the same time and place is during physical encounters. Even if OCCs are mainly developed online, participants do sometimes meet physically. In the Wikipedia and openesf.net cases, regular local meetings of participants are organized. Plus, both of these case study OCCs hold an annual meeting.
Wikihow and Flickr participants meet much more infrequently.
Transparency of participation
OCCs are developed in public, indeed it would be accurate to say that OCCs live in public. The analysis of 50 cases of OCCs showed that in 88% of the cases the content of communications among participants is publicly accessible. That is, it is possible to read the content of communications among participants without registering on the site. 
iv) Selfmanagement of contributions: The autonomous condition of participants in contributing to the building process
As pointed out in the previous section, the design of the platform of participation determines, to a large degree, the type of interaction and actions that can be performed by participants. Still, the participants have great flexibility in terms of the types of activities they develop and degrees of involvement they undertake. Participants decide their level of commitment and how they want to contribute freely and automatically on the basis of personal interests, motivations, resources and abilities. The distribution of participation is not based on centralized planning of user activities, but on decentralized, volunteers deciding for themselves. There is no gatekeeper or similar role in charge of prodding participants along in a particular direction. In the designed platform participants choose what to do. Participation is not driven by command, but by selfdirection. Additionally, participants "build" or "do".
Participation is mainly based on implementing tasks by directly creating or editing content. This is not a major risk. Online interaction facilitates the undoing of actions, and so mistakes are not irreparable. This implies that there is no separation between decisionmaking and implementation, or between a delegation and an implementation body. Those who take care of a task also have the authority to decide about how to perform it. This form of participation opens up the idea of doography or "implementation democracy". Finally, the coordination of participation is not the result of a strict, absolute and fixed plan.
Rather it is open to uncertainty and variation, based on principles of randomness and the serendipitous. This is so for the four case studies. That said, the Flickr platform is the most restrictive in terms of the types of activities that can be performed. Additionally, for some of the activities on Flickr, in contrast to the other cases, participants must pay for access, which may restrict access to some of the population.
High flexibility on the typology and degree of involvement
Not all participants necessarily carry out the same tasks. They choose among several, such as adding new content, editing content, and classifying content, among others. One person may contribute unedited information while another participant takes care of editing it and increasing its quality. Some tasks may require more effort and commitment than others, however, and in most cases, tasks are highly divided so that each participant can contribute either just a small part of a module or a large part, facilitating the scaling of participation.
Again, this must not be confused with a lack of structure. On the contrary the platforms are highly structured. There are also different levels of commitment to the platform in terms of time and active task performance. Participants' freedom to decide their level of contribution results in a very common distribution feature in OCCs. Research on the distribution of participation suggests a very unequal distribution known as the 90/9/1 principle or a power law. (Hill, Hollan, Wroblewski, and McCandless 1992; Nielsen 1997 ) 90% of visitors to OCCs tend to be lurkers who read or observe but never contribute, 9% contribute a little from time to time, and 1% contribute often and account for almost all the content and system activity. implies that for any participant, contributor or "free rider", mere "use" implies a contribution.
Nevertheless, this is only so where there is a sufficient number of contributors that assure the building of the resource.
The value of the information resources resulting from OCCs increases through several mechanisms as more people "use" them. First, nonparticipants contribute due to positive network effects. A network effect is that effect that one participant in an OCC has on the value of that OCC for other people, even if this was not intentional. When network effects appear more people become involved in an OCC, and the more valuable it becomes. For example, as more people use Flickr as a tool to connect with others, the more valuable it becomes since users can potentially connect with a larger number of people through it.
Second, in online environments most actions are translated into digital information, known as digital threads, and the elaboration of these digital threads form a source of very valuable information for the improvement of content and the functioning of the environment.
They can provide, for example, relational and attention data. The environment can learn about the connections between content according to how users navigate, or the number of times an article was visited or downloaded could be used as an indicator of the quality of that article.
Third, nonparticipants also play a role as an audience. Free rider audiences increase the relevance and value of a platform's content and increase the motives for participation.
Finally, it is also worth considering that even though exclusion is present in OCCs, restricting access to nonparticipants can be costly. Technically this might be challenging.
Additionally, digital culture values "simple", "easytouse" solutions. To incorporate filters might constitute an additional step that reduces the simplicity of the system and restricts its openness.
The distinction between strong/weak/nonparticipants is also present in the four case studies.
Previous analyses of Wikipedia have addressed the question of participation distribution and showed that contributions to Wikipedia also present strong inequalities. Ortega and GonzalezBarahona (2007) and Ortega (2009) conclude that less than 10% of the total number of authors are responsible for more than 90% of the total number of contributions or, conversely, 90% of active editors are responsible for less than 10% of the total number of contributions. The evolution of this inequality has remained very stable over time (with a typical value of between 80% and 85% of content produced by a "core team"). However, the authors also point out that the "core team" of very active participants is not necessarily formed by the same individuals over time.
Concerning the Wikihow case, from the analysis of a random day, it emerged that the top ten participants were responsible for almost half of the content produced that day (46.5%). (2013) points to a relative feature in the nondefinitive character of governance mechanism in peer production: even with formal rules, there is also the social norm that a rule can be broken if that makes sense for fulfilling a task. Lanzara and Morner (2003) pointed out that it is not that traditional mechanisms of governance and coordination are nonexistent or irrelevant in OCCs. In this sense, the governance of FLOSS projects results in a combination of formal organizational mechanisms and decentralized and spontaneous mechanisms for the community platform. (Lanzara and Morner 2003) According to these authors, the presence of formal organizational features, however, does not really play a dominant or pervasive role in FLOSS projects, and taken alone would not be strong enough to account for the impressive performance of large size projects.
In terms of the possibility to control and intervene in the definition of rules, on some occasions rules (and when applied roles) are defined by the communities. According to the analysis of 50 cases, in 51% of cases it is the community that is considered to be in charge of deciding policies and the distribution of tasks and roles. In the rest of the cases, rules are defined by the infrastructure provider.
In the cases of Wikipedia, openesf.net and Wikihow, the approach is that the community is in charge of defining policies, and also of choosing the people to fulfill roles where these are created, such as site administrators.
In the case of Wikipedia, the community collaborates in wiki pages to define common policies and administrators are chosen through elections. However, there is a general feeling among the participants that there are too many policies and that their overwhelming number results in the exclusion of new participants. (Lih 2009) Wikihow follows the same approach as Wikipedia, although the Wikihow case sees more intervention from the provider. For example, administrators are not selected by the community but by the provider.
In the case of openesf.net, there is no distinction between providers and community and so all infrastructure governance is based on community selfgovernance. However, these were defined during physical meetings of the web team charged with maintaining openesf.net, not by the openesf.net platform participants as the platform did not generate enough participation to develop a community dynamic of interaction.
In the case of Flickr, although each individual can choose conditions of access and other aspects that will apply to the content they generate, participants cannot decide the policies and rules of overall interaction. Furthermore, no roles or responsibilities for the maintenance of the platform are assigned to participants. Importantly, there is no collective decisionmaking over the roles and rules of the platform, these are defined by Yahoo!. In this regard, Flickr participation does not imply participation in governance in terms of defining the rules that govern community interaction.
vi) License (of the commonpool resource and code)
The license is a foundational rule in OCCs in the sense that it defines the resource management regime for the commonpool resource, the resources contributed and shared. The license also mediates the relationships between the constructed commons regime and the intellectual property regimes, where relevant. There are various types of licenses (from copyright, to several options of creative commons licenses that are more flexible on users' rights, and others). The license applies to both the commonpool resource (and the contributions of the participants) and the software code of the platform of participation.
Most OCCs in this study adopted free licenses for their content (68.1% of cases 
vii) Decisionmaking and conflict resolution systems in community interaction
Governance of OCCs depends on decision making institutions, including conflict resolution. Consensus decisionmaking is common in OCCs, yet they are also characterized by the pluralism of methods or polymorphism that involves the coexistence of several working or decisionmaking styles. This implies that there is no single way to solve all the situations of the platform, but a flexible approach that adopts several methods. The methodological pluralism of OCCs may appear to signal a lack of coherence in the overall system. However, for some researchers, this apparently chaotic diversity becomes a powerful resource for knowledge making and innovation. (Brown and Duguid 1991) The plurality of methods is also linked to the fact that OCCs tend to select methods according to their effectiveness in fulfilling their mission. The famous FLOSS catchphrase, "rough consensus and running code" captures the sense that actions which contribute to the accomplishment of the mission are more valuable than the precise use of a method.
In terms of polymorphy or plural methods, in Wikipedia most activity is primarily based on open groups on specific articles using consensus decisionmaking. However, the community combines this with a heterogeneous, sometimes secondary, mechanism to force decision making, block the violation of policies and contain the process within certain margins. On some occasions alternative forms of decisionmaking such as polls and voting are adopted.
There are also administrators with particular powers, tasks assigned historically to respected individuals and a charismatic leader (the founder).
In terms of plural methods Wikihow follows a similar approach to Wikipedia. Openesf uses mainly consensus decision making. Flickr is different to the other cases because the norms and in general the overall governance system are not defined by the community of participants, but by Yahoo! as Flickr's provider. between relational settings in which the OCCs is "locked" into the platform, and those where the community interaction is free and autonomous with respect to the platform. If the platform cannot be reproduced, the community relationship is "closed" within the specific platform which is dependent on the provider. If the platform can be replicated (can be forkable), the relationships are free from the specific platform provider. FLOSS and copyleft licensing allow platforms to be replicated, while proprietary software and restrictive or less open copyright license regimes do not. In other words, the use of FLOSS and a copyleft license creates conditions in which the community can have greater autonomy and freedom from the platform
provider.
An analysis of how 50 cases perform on the two specified axes of infrastructure governance was developed. (Fuster Morell 2010) From the analysis resulted four clusters of cases. These four provision models can be defined: corporation service (which is the case of Flickr), mission enterprise (Wikihow), autonomous representational foundation (Wikipedia) and assemblarian selfprovision models (openesf.net) (see figure II ).
The corporation model applies to cases of infrastructure platforms owned by companies with large pools of technological skills such as Yahoo!, the provider of Flickr. The corporate model of infrastructure governance is characterized by a provider body closed to participant involvement and based on black box conditions. It follows a forprofit strategy. Participants are "trapped" in the platform (unless they exit), as the copyright and proprietary software framework restricts the freedom and autonomy of the participants in the platform.
The mission enterprise model is characterized by being forprofit, and hence closed to participant involvement. Importantly, the enterprise model is based on netenabler conditions, which favor the autonomy of collaboration. Furthermore, according to the statistical analysis, the enterprise model is characterized by more netenabler conditions than the foundation model. The enterprise model applies to startups which maintain independence from big communications companies. It is a strategy for developing new business models which are 
III. Models of OCCs governance
In the previous sections, the eight dimensions that give direction and govern OCCs were presented. In this section, we present how these eight dimensions link one another.
The analysis of the juxtaposition or interaction between the eight dimensions reveals that infrastructure provision is central. Infrastructure provision also determines some of the other eight aspects linked to the governance of OCCs. Infrastructure provision involves the provision of the platform of participation and the control over its design (code), the license, formal policies (such as terms of use), and, on some occasions, initiates the process and establishes the mission, and controls decisionmaking on conflicts around community interaction (see figure III) . Still some other dimensions, like selfmanagement of contributors in selfdirecting their action is not controlled by the infrastructure provider. There is any command mechanism that force contributors or direct their actions. In this regard, the modality of governance of the infrastructure also contributes to shaping other dimensions of governance (see figure IV) . Where there is openness to Wikipedia and selfassemblarian models of openesf), the community has, structurally, more control over the design of the platform of participation and the license.
Furthermore, according to the statistical analysis of 50 cases, openness to community involvement in infrastructure provision is correlated with a community having a decision making mechanism, (Fuster Morell 2010: 155) a role in conflict resolution at the community level, deciding its formal rules, a free license that also grants that the community owns the commonpool resource, and netenabler conditions (including the right to fork). However, some of these aspects (a community having a decisionmaking mechanism and a role in conflict resolution at the community level, deciding its formal rules, having a free license) are also present in the mission enterprise model of Wikihow even if this model is closed to community involvement in infrastructure provision.
The corporate model of Flickr is where most sources of control are in the hands of the infrastructure provider, and the community of users (both individually and collectively) is most disempowered in comparison to the other cases. In the corporate model of Flickr, the community does not have control over the design of the platform of participation, does not have decision mechanisms and does not defines the rules, and the license does not favor community autonomy, but dependency on the infrastructure provider (see figure IV) . In sum, the level of control and power over governance of the community of participants, in contrast to the infrastructure provision, are higher in the selfprovision assembly model of openesf, followed by the representative foundation of Wikipedia, the mission enterprise of Wikihow, and finally the corporation model of Flickr. However, in all of the cases, participants selfmanage their own contribution, and the infrastructure provider depends importantly on the participants in developing the content.
IV. OCCs outcomes
Following IAD the three exogenous aspects presented in the previous section resource characteristics, community attributes and governance contribute to shape the action arena.
The action arena is defined by action situations, that is, the design of the situation in which a particular person takes the decision to contribute or not. participants in positions choosing among actions at a particular stage of a decision process in light of their control over a choice node, the information they have, the outcomes that are likely, and the benefits and costs they perceive for these outcomes". Action arenas result in patterns of interaction and, ultimately, those patterns result in particular outcomes. For the sake of space we will not analyze action situations in the context of this chapter.
Additionally, the IAD framework points out that action arenas impact OCCs outcomes.
OCCs and cultural commons more generally are building processes. They are not provided by nature as in natural commons, but are constructed and this process is organic to commonpool resources. The ability or inability of OCCs to end in outcomes is a relevant aspect for the IAD.
However, it is not clear if Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg take outcomes into consideration in their reframing of the IAD model. However, they do stress that "a cultural commons should be assessed not only in light of its ostensible purposes but also in light of its consequences. This aspect of the case study approach should both identify the consequences and describe relevant criteria for evaluating them. " (2008: 705) In terms of outcomes of OCCs, we would like to differentiate between two sets of outcomes: outcomes in terms of commonpool resources (amount of content, quality of content, usage of content, etc.) and the building process. As commonpool resources in OCCs are built rather than simply "there", we consider it relevant to integrate the capacity of IAD to engage with participation and collaboration in the evaluation of OCCs outcomes, in order to see whether it contributes more benefits than costs and is worth sustaining.
According to the analysis of 50 cases, the four different infrastructure governance models highlighted have different capacities to engage with participation and collaboration in OCCs. First, the analysis suggests that not all the models are able to generate the same size of community. Second, not all the models are able to engage or increase collaboration levels.
Third, some models are more suited to complex collaboration than others.
Concerning the two axes ordering infrastructure governance, dependency on In terms of how each of the four models shapes the community, none of the models combine a large community size with collaborativeness. The corporation model generates the biggest communities, based on lower levels of collaboration while the foundation and enterprise models are able to raise midsized communities, and are more collaborative. Finally, the assembly model is the weakest in terms of generating (active) OCCs. According to the case studies analysis, these diverse performances could be linked to the diverse ability to generate resources, the ability to manage resources according to organizational strategy, the ability to inspire trust and motivate contributions, and the ability to create conditions favoring collaboration (or not) through the type of license and software and the design of the platform of participation.
In sum, more empowering conditions of the community favor outcomes in terms of collaborativeness, but not size. Of the eight "design principles" that Ostrom (1990) but not a high level of participation in OCCs.
V. Conclusions
OCCs are a particular type of cultural or knowledge commons. In this chapter, we provided a characterization of OCCs governance as a complex system in which eight critical aspects define their direction: collective mission or goal of the process; cultural principles/social norms; design of the platform of participation (where regulation is embedded in the code); selfmanagement of contributions; formal policies applied to community interaction; license; decisionmaking and conflict resolution systems with regard to community interaction; and infrastructure provision.
The sustainable model is also a critical question for OCCs. However, we did not expand on this aspect in the chapter and it might be considered for further research.
The empirical analysis of fifty statistical cases and four case studies reveals the centrality of one of the dimensions in configuring some of the other governance dimensions and in determining the outcomes. However, the selfdirection or autonomy of the contributors in allocating their own resources (without command mechanisms) is also a relevant aspect determining the power interplays in OCCs.
Applicability of IAD to OCCs
In this chapter, we have adapted and applied the IAD framework to OCCs by analyzing the resource characteristics of OCCs, their community attributes and governance, and to then approach how governance of OCCs might explain their ability to raise participation and collaboration.
Clearly this was a very limited application of IAD, as action situations were not analyzed, nor the interplay between the different aspects presented. Still we hope it provides an overview of OCCs as an important case of constructed commons and how IAD could be applied.
IAD is a very useful framework to analyze OCCs, as it allows us to approach the interplay between the characteristics of a commonpool resource, the characteristics of a community and the political and institutional arrangements for its governance, and explain how these link to action arenas and ultimately, to outcomes. (Ostrom 2007) In applying IAD, we build upon previous adaptations. (Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg, 2010; Schweik and English 2012) In line with Ostrom's original IAD and Schweik and English's (2012) adaptation of it to the FLOSS case, we consider it useful to retain the differentiation between resource characteristics, community attributes, and rules of law. In contrast, it is stressed less in Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg (2010) . Beyond finding it useful to stress the distinction between resource characteristics, community attributes and rules of law as Schweik and English (2012) leadership or financing as part of community attributes, while we consider these as part of the governance, too.
Coming back to Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg (2012) , the authors seem to suggest deemphasizing how the clusters of issues to consider are related to the dimensions of outcomes, or the question of the outcome more generally. At least, they note that given the complex dynamics involved, it may be difficult to separate outcomes from the resources and communities that produce them over time. Still, we emphasize that even if difficult, analysis of outcomes is useful. Adopting an IAD based approach may result in expanding the number of variables to consider, which along with the richness of the framework makes it worthwhile.
However, without the outcome dimension (or explanatory analysis more generally) we see difficulties for other researchers to adopt the frame, as presenting the clusters suggested by
Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg becomes a research project of its own without a similar or specific explanatory line to engage with.
Madison, Frischmann and Strandburgs frame applies to constructing cultural commons as a category. It is the case that constructed cultural or knowledge commonpool resources share some commonalities (more than they do with natural commons); however, it is still a very diverse set. The constructing cultural commons category might be useful for some purposes, but in our view, it is too broad a category to apply IAD equally or uniformly. In this line, the background environment described by Madison, Frischmann and Strandburg does not totally apply or capture the context of OCCs. As Ostrom points out, the evil is in the context and the details (1990). Even if the overall frame of IAD is useful, the clusters of issues related to resource characteristics, community attributes, rules in use, action arenas and outcomes needed to apply IAD to a particular commons need to be much more specified and contextualized for each type of constructed commons.
What defines OCCs as "commons"?
Fuster Morell, M. Governance of online creation communities for the building of digital commons: Viewed through the framework of the institutional analysis and development. IAD was developed initially to investigate natural "commons". In this last section, we would like to address the question of the conditions that define the diverse types of "commons" as "commons".
Natural "commons" has received substantial attention. (Ostrom 1990) governance design that maintains community control over the collaborative process of building the commonpool resource. In this regard, both open access resources provision and community governance should be considered for characterize OCCs as "commons" to avoid possible confusion. This does not imply that the community governance as a condition for a "commons" in OCCs implies the community governance model of natural "commons", but the community governance in OCCs functioning, as characterized in this chapter.
In the following, we argue why we consider both open access and community governance as conditions for a "commons" in OCCs. In OCCs, the resource is not already available, but needs to be produced and preserved. The production process is based on collaborative and voluntary engagement, and this implies that certain aspects be taken into consideration. On the one hand, the process of production is not based on labor; that is, it is not a contractual relationship of exchanging work per a salary, which tends to be the case when building a road. Rather it is a voluntary and collaborative relationship. This raises the question of whether community could be disempowered from the resource management it produces, and lack control equally in voluntary and collaborative production as in labor conditions. Additionally, this disempowerment in voluntary communities might affect pro social motivation characteristic of OCCs. A key component to drive community governance in
OCCs according to our analysis is the infrastructure governance, because it is important in itself, and because it is a point of control over other dimensions of the governance. Some level of community control over infrastructure is central for community governance as we have argued across this chapter.
Furthermore, the idea of detaching the community from the resource might be questioned. In OCCs the outcome is not only the resources in terms of the archive of knowledge, but the community itself. The resource could not be produced or preserved without the community. In other words, the "production" of the community is a precondition for the possibility to produce the resource. Particularly, in regards to the infrastructure, infrastructure governance is not neutral. As we have noted previously in this chapter, infrastructure provision shapes the community and the resource. Again, this raises the question of whether community could be detached from the resource it produces.
If we consider only open access as a condition for OCCs to be a "commons," Flickr and In sum, commonpoolproduced resources should not only be regarded according to how they are provided (open access) and owned (property), but to how they are produced. In other words, the conditions of production and control over the means of production is a highly relevant question. Flanagin and Stohl (2005) suggest that the freeriding analysis of costs and benefits as applied to information goods is challenged by some of the emerging characteristics of online communities. In the authors' approach the perceived cost of contributing to collective actions via contemporary electronic tools is a relatively weak or even an unimportant factor in explaining individuals' decisions to contribute to information repositories. In their words: "When (contribution) is costly, boundary crossing typically takes on the characteristics of a discrete decision. When participation is easy and not costly, it is less of an issue of a decision" (2005, 378) . Second, some contributions do not necessarily involve a decision. For example, in their side effects contributions become "unintended", there is no decision to contribute, the contribution is the result of some other intention, such as using the content. 
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